Daily Current Affairs

Asiatic caracal (GS Paper 3, Environment)

Context:

• The cheetah returned to India after seven decades recently. But the caracal, which was used by India’s nobility in the sport of coursing like the cheetah, is struggling to survive, although both species had a similar distribution in the past.
• A team of researchers have now mapped out the most suitable areas for the species to survive in India.

 

About Asiatic caracal:

• The Asiatic caracal (Caracal caracalschmitzi) is an elusive medium-sized and locally threatened felid (cat) species, which has been widely reported to be on the brink of extinction in India.
• The reasons are large-scale hunting, illegal trading and loss of natural habitats are considered significant threats to the species.
• The caracal is currently included in Schedule I of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and the Near Threatened category by the Conservation Assessment and Management Plan and International Union for Conservation of Nature Red list assessment in India.

 

Recent Research:

• The research was conducted by a team of researchers from the Wildlife Institute of India (WII), Dehradun; the Indian Space Research Organisation; the Madhya Pradesh Forest Department and the Leo Foundation, Wageningen, The Netherlands.
• They aimed “to identify the potential regions where the caracal might exist in India, based on fine-scale ensemble modelling of its distribution.”
• The researchers also “intended to evaluate various protected areas where conservation efforts for caracals can be planned from the management and conservation outlook.”

 

Potential habitat:

• The researchers found the most significant potential habitat for caracals in Rajasthan, with an area of 25,221.38 square kilometres, followed by Gujarat (16,652.1 sq km), Madhya Pradesh (6416.01 sq km), Haryana (191.36 sq km), Uttar Pradesh (131.11 sq km), and Maharashtra (34.17 sq km).
• The most suitable areas for caracals on the district level were found to be in the Kutch district of Gujarat; Sheopur, Morena, and Shivpuri of Madhya Pradesh and Sirohi, Jalore, Alwar, Karauli, SawaiMadhopur, Kota, Dhaulpur, Bundi, Baran, Jaipur, Tonk and Dausa of Rajasthan.
• The most suitable habitat for caracals in Rajasthan, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh is located in Kutch, the Malwa Plateau, the Aravalli hill range and the Bundelkhand region, according to the researchers.
• They large amounts of caracal suitable habitats in India fell within protected areas, thus providing an excellent opportunity for its conservation in the already existing management and conservation setup.
• The protected areas which provided high conservation potential for caracals included Kachchh Wildlife Sanctuary (WLS) in Gujarat, the tiger reserves of Ranthambhore,  Mukundra hills and Sariska and the WLS of Kumbhalgarh, Mount Abu and Todgarh-Raoli in Rajasthan, as well as Gandhi Sagar WLS in Madhya Pradesh.

 

History:

• “The caracal was the only other feline which was used for hunting in India. Just when it came to be so used is unclear but it is known that Firoz Shah Tughlaq had many of them in his hunting establishment and it was well established in the Mughal Court for AbulFazl records that Akbar was very fond of using this plucky little animal for hunting purposes…” author Divyabhanusinh noted in his book, ‘End of a trail: The Cheetah in India’.
• The animal had no Hindi or Urdu name but was known in India by its Persian name of Siyahgosh or ‘black ears’.
• The Saidnamah-i-Nigarin manual from the Bundela Rajput princely state of Ajaigarh in Central India records that the caracal can be trained to hunt squirrels as well as birds such as kites, cranes and crows. It can also be trained to hunt animals far larger than itself such as the cheetal, the barasingha and the nilgai.
• End of a trail notes that the sport of hunting with caracals probably disappeared before World War II, Independence and Partition.

 

 

Insurgency down in northeast, Army shifts to LAC

(GS Paper 3, Internal Security)

 

Why in news?

• The overall law and order situation has improved in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Manipur.
• The counter-insurgency operations are largely being carried out by the Assam Rifles and the Army is focusing on reorientation of the troops along the LAC.

 

Details:

• With insurgency having significantly gone down in the northeast as seen by recent revocation of Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in several parts of the region, the Army has been able to pull out most of its troops from counter-insurgency (CI) duties to refocus on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) amid the stand-off with China in Eastern Ladakh in the last two years.
• Assam Rifles is now responsible for all CI duties.
• There is only one Army Brigade in the entire Eastern sector now tasked with CI duties with its mandate spread across four districts of Assam bordering Arunachal.

 

Persistent threat:

• While space for United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) is shrinking, residual potential still remains and “it’s a threat in being” as threat of use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), kidnapping and extortion loom large.
• However, their operational space is reducing due to constant pressure on themand outreach to people for development.

 

Achievements in disturbed areas of Northeast:

• The lifting of AFSPA from areas of Manipur, Nagaland and Assam is a “momentous achievement” made possible by reduction in violence, the Act is now restricted to only those areas where remnants of militancy still exist.
• The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has also been active and keeping up the pressure. In addition to dwindling recruitment, there have also been desertions among the cadres and also differences among the various factions.
• In this regard, the footprint of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) has been seen in Assam of late, with inputs suggesting that that NSCN (Ky) is working with ULFA. NSCN (Ky) is active in Longding, Tirap and Changlng districts of Nagaland and so offers a conduit for ULFA.
• Among the various initiatives by the Army to win hearts and minds of the people, those that have caught attention are an effort to impart training in football and another to impart training to students to crack national-level entrance examinations for engineering and medicine.

Football tournament:

• The ‘Capt. Jintu Gogoi, VrC Memorial Football Tournament’organised in February-March this year by the Army in coordination with the Assam Football Association and Tinsukia District Sports Authority was a huge draw.
• It brought together 64 teams from several districts of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.
• Capt. Gogoi from Assam served in 17 Garhwal Rifles and was posthumously awarded the Vir Chakra (VrC) for his actions during the Kargil conflict of 1999.

What’s next?

• Two Divisions of troops have been pulled off CI duties and redeployed along the Line of Actual Control in tune with the overall reorientation towards the LAC carried out by the Army since the May 2020 stand-off.
•  Of the 3,488-km-long LAC, 1,346 km falls in the Eastern sector.

The ban on the export of broken rice

(GS Paper 3, Economy)

Why in news?

• Recently, the Centre instituted a ban on the export of broken rice.
• Additionally, it mandated an export duty of 20% on rice in husk (paddy or rough), husked (brown rice) and semi-milled or wholly-milled rice. The measures do not affect export of basmati or parboiled rice. 

Why ban has been imposed?

• The measures would ensure adequate availability of broken rice for consumption by the domestic poultry industry and for other animal feedstock.
• Additionally, it would sustain production of ethanol that would further assist the successful implementation of the Union government’s Ethanol Blending Programme (EBP).
• However, the measures may affect countries dependent on Indian food exports in the face of a lost ‘breadbasket’ in Ukraine owing to the Russian conflict.

 

What does it have to do with inflation?

• The lower the supply of a commodity, the higher would be the price of a product, which results in inflationary pressures.
• The adequacy of rice stocks in the country would ensure that markets do not experience excess demand and thus, trigger an abrupt price rise.
• For seven consecutive months, inflation has been above the Reserve Bank of India’s 6% tolerability threshold. The Consumer Price Index (CPI), or retail-based inflation, stood at 7% in August 2022 with rural and urban inflation scaling 7.15% and 6.72% respectively. This was furthered by an uptick of 7.62% in food prices during the same period.

 

Pradhan MantriGaribKalyan Anna Yojana (PM-GKAY):

• The COVID-19 pandemic also had an impact on India’s previously held surplus. As a reaction to the distresses caused by the pandemic to the vulnerable sections the Union Cabinet had introduced a food security program, called the Pradhan MantriGaribKalyan Anna Yojana (PM-GKAY) in March 2020.
• The scheme provisions an additional 5kg ration per person each month in addition to their normal quota of foodgrains under the National Food Security Act. In March, the scheme was extended for another six months until September 2022.
• The foodgrain stocks (including rice, wheat and unmilled paddy) in the Food Corporation of India (FCI)’s central pool had dropped 33.5% on a year-over-year basis to 60.11 million tonnes as of September 1, prompting doubts on the continuation of the scheme.
• Research analysts observe that on the whole, though rice stocks should remain above buffer levels, the current export restrictions may not necessarily improve the demand-supply situation materially, implying, that there remains an upside risk to the price of rice.

 

Rice production in 2022:

Conditions for Rice cultivations:

• The major rice cultivation season in India is the Kharifseason, that entails sowing the crop during June-July and harvesting them in November-December.
• It is imperative to note that rice is a water-intensive crop which also requires a hot and humid climate. Thus, it is best suited to regions which have high humidity, prolonged sunshine and an assured supply of water.
• It is for this reason that the eastern and southern regions of the country, with sustainable humidity and suitable mean temperatures are deemedfavourable for the crop.
• While the two regions are able to grow paddy crops throughout the year, higher rainfall and temperature prompt the northern regions to grow only one crop of rice from May to November. Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Punjab, Haryana, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are among the rice producing States in India.

 

Deficit rainfall:

• A perusal of Indian Meteorological Dept’s data, between June 1 and September 14 illustrate that Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Punjab and Bihar have experienced deficient rainfall.
• The latter refers to rainfall being 20-59% below normal in a particular region. Although West Bengal, the country’s largest producer, has overall experienced a normal rainfall, its major productivity areas such as Nadia, Burdwan and Birbhum have had deficient rainfall. This indicates a potentially lower produce this year.

 

What are the concerns on ethanol blending?

• Ethanol is an agro-based product, mainly produced from molasses, which is a by-product of the sugar industry.
• The EBP endeavours to blend ethanol with vehicular fuels as a means to combat the use of fossil fuels and in turn, rising pollution. As per the government, sugar-based feed stocks alone would not be able to meet its stipulated target of 20% ethanol blending by 2025.
• In the 2018-19 Ethanol Supply Year (ESY), the government had allowed the FCI to sell surplus rice to ethanol plants for fuel production. The idea was to have in place an insurance scheme and an emergency provision for distillers.
• However, in the ongoing ESY, because of supply constraints there has been an uptick in the procurement of rice from the FCI. The total ethanol produced from rice lifted from the FCI stood at 26.64 crore litres whereas that from damaged food grains outside the FCI purview stood at 16.36 crore litres.
• This means that the production accruing from FCI rice has increased 10-fold from the 2.2 crore litres used in a full ESY. At the same time, production from damaged foodgrains stands at half.
• Thus, the export ban would endeavour to catch-up with this supply and additionally, unburden the FCI from provisioning to distillers.

 

What are the likely after-effects of the ban?

• Geopolitical tensions between Russia and Ukraine have unsettled global food supply chains. With trade disrupted in the Black Sea region, Bloomberg reported in March that prices of rice are surging because traders are betting it will be an alternative for wheat which is becoming prohibitively expensive.
• India accounted for 41% of the total rice exports in the world in 2021 larger than the next four exporters (Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan and United States) combined.
• As for broken rice, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) states that India accounted for more than half of the commodity’s global exports in the first half of 2022.
• As per government figures, between April and August 2022, broken rice’s share in the overall rice export mix (of India) was 22.78% compared to 18.89% in FY 2021.
• In descending order, China, Senegal, Vietnam, Djibouti and Indonesia are the biggest importers of India’s broken rice.

 

A disruptive nexus of China and Pakistan

(GS Paper 2, International Relation)

Context:

• Recently, China used its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to put a hold on the UN Security Council’s Al Qaida and ISIL (Daesh) Sanctions Committee’s (also known as the UNSC 1267 Committee) listing of Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist Sajid Mir.
• Terrorist Sajid Mir is one of India’s most wanted in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. 

Background:

• Earlier, China had blocked the listing of US-designated terrorists Abdul RehmanMakki and Abdul Rauf Azhar of the LeT and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), respectively.
• It may be recalled that China brazenly opposed the listing of JeM chief Masood Azhar for ten years until 2019 before lifting the hold.
• These terrorists are based in Pakistan and enjoy the patronage of its “deep state”.
•  Despite China’s efforts to save its “all weather friend” from global censure, Pakistan continues to be in the “grey list” of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

 

Misuse of P-5 status:

• China’s misuse of its P-5 status disrupts collective efforts to counter terrorism. Such actions are in direct contrast to the consensus at the global level on the scourge that is international terrorism.
• Counter-terrorism is not the only area in which the Sino-Pak tandem has weakened global efforts. The two have a long history of collusion in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems as well.
• There are other examples of collaboration in military matters and in the area of infrastructure and connectivity that have proved destabilising to regional stability in South Asia.

 

Missile proliferation:

• The Sino-Pak nexus in the field of nuclear and missile proliferation is well recorded. The illicit A.Q. Khan network evolved into a three-way proliferation with China and Pakistan helping one another with bomb designs. Together, the two countries also helped North Korea with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies.
• The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had reported that between 1991 and 1993, China supplied 34 M-11 short range missiles to Pakistan in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
• Subsequent cooperation included Chinese supply to Pakistan of ring magnets for high-speed centrifuges and the grandfathering of existing arrangements to deepen cooperation through the Chashma series of nuclear reactors.

 

Military exports to Pakistan:

• Strong military ties have been the bedrock of China-Pakistan relations since the 1960s. For China, this has emerged as a low-cost tool to balance India and keep it hemmed in the sub-continent.
• Around 47% of China’s military exports go to Pakistan and involve the full spectrum of support from small arms to fighter jets, as well as ships and submarines.
• These include advanced equipment such as the JF-17 fighter jets, the K-8 training aircraft, Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), the Al-Khalid tanks and the Babur cruise missile, among others.

 

CPEC Project:

• The so-called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) is one of the mainstays of connectivity under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• It violates the Sino-Pak border agreement of March 1963, Article 6 of which explicitly refers to its interim nature. Undertaken without any wider consultation with India, which has territorial claims over the region through which it runs, the CPEC has proved disruptive to both India-Pakistan and India-China relations.
• China got engaged in the CPEC project for its own ends, more strategic than economic. The Karakoram Highway passes through the Khunjerab Pass and facilitates direct linkages between occupied Kashmir territory on both sides, including the trans-Karakoram tract of Shaksgam claimed by India, now part of China-occupied Kashmir.
• The CPEC offers China access to the Indian Ocean, natural resources and facilitates greater control over a strategic partner prone to upheavals.
• Today, China is one of Pakistan’s largest lenders, holding more than 27% of Pakistan’s debt. Bilateral trade hovers around $20 billion but is skewed in favour of China which enjoys a huge favourable balance of trade in the region of $18 billion.
• There are signs of resentment in Pakistan at over-dependence on China, and the exploitative and usurious terms inherent in the CPEC projects.

 

Jammu and Kashmir Angle:

• One of the abiding features of the Sino-Pak collusion concerns the status of Jammu and Kashmir. During the 1950s, China’s position on the Kashmir issue was relatively neutral.
• In the 1960s and 1970s, after the border conflict with India, China stepped up its rhetoric of support for “self-determination” for the people of Kashmir on the basis of UN resolutions.
• As the 1980s progressed and as relations between India and China gradually improved, China’s stand underwent some change, with emphasis on resolving the issue on the basis of UN resolutions and relevant bilateral agreements.
• After the abrogation of Article 370 by India in August 2019, China vehemently opposed the internal political changes effected by India. China unsuccessfully tried, thrice, to trigger discussions on J&K in the UN Security Council at the behest of Pakistan.
• Itself a party to the Kashmir dispute, China is pushing Pakistan to alter the status of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) by converting it into its fifth province.
• The intention is to dilute the interim character of the 1963 agreement between the two countries and consolidate the de facto possession of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) territory by Pakistan and that of Shaksgam by China.

 

Political support:

• Apart from synchronising their positions at the UN, China and Pakistan have created new tandems extending to other international organisations such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).Pakistan is China’s main bridge to Islamic world.
• Pakistan plays a key role in fending off pressure on China within the OIC on account of its human rights violations in Xinjiang and the ill-treatment of its Muslim minorities, especially the Uyghurs.
• Pakistan also remains sensitive to Chinese concerns with regard to East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) separatists seeking refuge in FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas).

 

Economic support:

• As Pakistan has gradually drifted away from the U.S., it has moved closer to China. China’s economic rise and growing clout is an enticing factor for a stricken economy such as that of Pakistan.
• In return for giving Pakistan a reprieve at the UN in the listing of Pak-based terrorists, China uses the former to secure its interests in the OIC. The OIC has adopted hypocritical positions on the treatment of the Muslim minority in Xinjiang.

Conclusion:

• There is little doubt that China uses Pakistan as a proxy military and nuclear power against India. A key strategic objective for China is to seek access to basing facilities in Gwadar and other sites in the Indian Ocean littoral.
• Moreover, Pakistan’s use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy appears, ironically, to be valued and encouraged by China, as demonstrated by the latter’s actions at the UN.