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India’s net direct tax collections have crossed ₹7 lakh crore so far this year, 23.33% higher than the same period last year, signalling a clear post-pandemic rebound in the economy, the Finance Ministry said.
Net direct tax collections as on Saturday stood at ₹7,00,669 crore, compared to ₹5,68,147 crore as of September 17, 2021, with corporate taxes inflow constituting little over a half of the kitty at ₹3,68,484 crore. Personal Income Tax and the Securities Transaction Tax (STT) have yielded ₹3.3 lakh crore.
Direct tax collections continue to grow at a robust pace, a clear indicator of the revival of economic activity post pandemic, as also the result of the stable policies of the Government, focusing on simplification and streamlining of processes and plugging of tax leakage through effective use of technology.
Gross Direct Tax revenues were 30.2% higher than the same period of 2021-22, at ₹8,36,225 crore. This included Corporation Tax of ₹4.36 lakh crore and Personal Income Tax, including STT of ₹3,98,440 crore.
Tax Deducted at Source accounted for over ₹4.34 lakh crore of the gross Tax kitty, while Self-Assessment Tax was ₹77,164 crore.
Advance tax collections stood at ₹2,95,308 crore, 17% higher than the corresponding period of 2021-22, with corporate tax contributing a little over ₹2.29 lakh crore and personal income tax inflows, bringing in the rest of the ₹66,176 crore.
The Ministry said there has been a “remarkable increase in the speed of processing of income tax returns filed during the current financial year” with almost 93% of the duly verified ITRs having been processed till September 17.
This has resulted in faster issue of refunds with almost a 468% increase in the number of refunds issued in the current financial year. Refunds amounting to ₹1,35,556 crore have been issued till 17.09.2022, as against refunds of ₹74,140 crore issued during the corresponding period in the preceding financial Year 2021-22, showing a growth of over 83%.
Regular Assessment Tax contributed ₹20,080 crore to the gross direct tax collections and tax under other minor heads brought in another ₹8,933 crore.
Lumpy skin disease virus different from 2019 version (Page no. 1)
(GS Paper 2, Health)
The lumpy skin disease (LSD) virus that has killed at least 50,000 cattle in India this year maybe structurally different from the version of the virus prevalent in India in 2019, raising questions on whether the new vaccine being developed for safeguarding cattle may be adequately protective.
Scientists at the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research-Institute of Genomics and Integrative Biology (CSIR-IGIB) and the State Disease Diagnostic Centre, Jaipur analysed five animals with symptoms of the disease and compared genomes of the virus extracted from them.
Six genomes (there were multiple genomes from a single animal) showed that it had “little similarity to global genomes” when compared with genetic sequences from earlier outbreaks of the disease.
The analysis of the genomes revealed 177 unique variants, none of which were found in four genome sequences from India belonging to the 2019 outbreak of the disease deposited in GenBank, a popular database.
Analysis of the viral sequences suggests the genomes from the 2022 outbreak harbour a large number of genetic variations compared to the reference genome and form a distinct lineage.
This is significant as Lumpi-ProVacInd, a vaccine developed by the Indian Veterinary Research Institute, and the Indian Council of Agricultural Research’s (ICAR) National Research Centre on Equines is based on LSD virus samples from cattle in Ranchi afflicted in the 2019 outbreak.
However, experimental trials conducted on animals afflicted in the ongoing 2022 outbreak with the vaccine have revealed encouraging results, ICAR and the Ministry of Agriculture have stated.
The vaccine is a live attenuated, or a weakened version of the virus that when injected into animals is expected to stimulate the immune system and protect against a probable infection.
Currently, the only vaccines available for the disease are vaccines for goat pox and sheep pox, which are related to the LSD virus.
This specific study, he said, threw no light as there were too few animals tested and only a broader sample of viral genomes spanning several States could answer if the variants identified and analysed in Rajasthan as part of the study were widespread in India.
States
‘Online dispute resolution is an example of social engineering’ (Page no. 6)
(GS Paper 2, Polity and Governance)
More than 16 million disputes have been onboarded in Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) systems in the country two years after NITI Ayog’s initiative to advance ODRs said NandanNilekani, Chairman and Co-founder Infosys.
He was addressing the graduating students at the 30th annual convocation ceremony of National Law School of India University (NLSIU) and spoke about the importance of social engineering and better informal systems where many legal issues in the country can be resolved.
Mr. Nilekani recalled how two years ago, many stakeholders including the businesses, ODR providers, government and legal service authorities made a pledge and as a result of which, the advancement can be seen today.
ODR refers to the resolution of disputes through technology and Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes. He added that more than 100 companies and 40 government departments now use ODR.
He also cited a recent incident where a non-profit organisation called Ajeevika Bureau employed ODR to resolve over 3,000 wage disputes from during the pandemic times between migrant labourers and their contractors.
It is necessary to reinvent structures and systems not just inside the government but also in industry and civil society, he said.
He pointed out how lack of effective systems and structures affects the poor and marginalised while also widening the opportunity gap.
“We need this form of social engineering — this new leadership with the agency at its heart – to advance our law and justice systems urgently”, Mr. Nilekani said while pointing out the need to design the new future systems of business, government and society to minimise friction, provide scope for diversity and prevent issues from arising.
After two virtual convocations in 2020 and 2021, NLSIU celebrated this year’s ceremony at Dr.Babu Rajendra Prasad International Convention Centre in GKVK campus.
Chief Justice of India and Chancellor of NLSIU, UdayUmeshLalit presented the degrees to the graduating students as well as gold medal awardees.
A total of 829 students, which included six from Ph.D programme, one from Master of Philosophy, 53 from Master of Public Policy, 40 from Master of Laws, 76 from Bachelor of Arts and Laws (Honours) and 653 students from Online and Hybrid Education programmes graduated this year.
Chief Justices of various High Courts, judges of Supreme Court and High Courts, Chairman, Bar Council of India, Vice Chancellor of NLSIU, SudhirKrishnaswamy were present during the convocation.
Editorial
Geopolitics without geoeconomics, a fool’s errand (Page no. 8)
(GS Paper 2, International Relations)
Over the past few years, New Delhi has developed a keen desire to be part of the geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific and has gone about it with great aplomb.
It has managed to emerge as a major pivot of the global Indo-Pacific grand strategic imagination, avoided the temptations to militarise/securitise the Quad (Australia, Japan, India and the United States), and has ensured that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states do not feel uneasy by the ever-increasing balance of power articulations in the Indo-Pacific.
And yet, New Delhi’s vision for the Indo-Pacific appears half-baked and unsustainable in the long term, given the inadequate attention New Delhi is prepared to give to the geo-economic developments of the Indo-Pacific.
Policymakers in New Delhi today do not appear to appreciate the inescapable linkages between geopolitics and geoeconomics.
Put differently, even as contemporary great power behaviour has moved beyond the classical geopolitical imageries, thereby emphasising geoeconomics as the foundation of geopolitics, New Delhi continues to be stuck in the old binaries.
India’s decision to take to the Indo-Pacific and Quad in a big way while unwilling to join two of the region’s key multilateral trading agreements goes to show that geoeconomics and geopolitics are imagined and pursued parallelly in New Delhi, not as complimenting each other.
The most recent example is India’s refusal to join the trade pillar of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) while deciding to join the three other pillars of the IPEF — supply chains, tax and anti-corruption, and clean energy.
India’s move to stay out of IPEF, a U.S.-sponsored soft trade arrangement at best, comes two years after India walked out of the negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) which came to effect earlier this year. Both the agreements lay at the heart of the Indo-Pacific and could potentially shape the economic character of the broader Indo-Pacific region.
India’s decision to stay out of the IPEF is surprising because it seems out of sync with the recent enthusiasm in New Delhi about foreign trade agreements.
When the Narendra Modi government took office in 2014, it immediately began reviewing existing trade agreements and paused any new free trade negotiations, a policy that continued for close to seven years.
Modi 1.0 showcased an unambiguous lack of policy interest in promoting external trade and engaging in free trade negotiations.
And then all of a sudden, in the wake of COVID-19, New Delhi began exhibiting a new enthusiasm to rethink the country’s external trade policy. Modi 2.0 started warming up to free trade agreements (FTAs).
For instance, India concluded an FTA with the United Arab Emirates earlier this year, signed Early Harvest Agreements with Australia and the United Kingdom, and several more agreements are being negotiated.
However, the recent decision to stay out of the IPEF shows a clear policy direction in New Delhi: by not becoming a part of the IPEF and RCEP, and signing FTAs with individual states, New Delhi has made it clear that it favours bilateral agreements, and is not keen on multilateral, plurilateral and even soft agreements such as the IPEF.
The gender pay gap, hard truths and actions needed (Page no. 8)
(GS Paper 2, Social Justice)
India is among the most important countries when it comes to the global economic growth and structural transformation story.
A commensurate improvement in its labour market outcomes and a fair distribution of the fruits of economic progress will spur further economic growth and the benefits it brings.
But, unsurprisingly, in a country the size and diversity of India, asymmetries still abound in the country’s labour market.
Yesterday was the Third International Equal Pay Day 2022 — the day falls on September 18 — and it is time to pause and reflect on the extent of progress made towards closing the gender pay gap and reaffirming our collective commitment to the effective and accelerated realisation of the principle ‘equal pay for work of equal value’.
This ‘becomes all the more important in the present context’, given the disproportionate effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on women workers in terms of job and income losses.
Full and productive economic growth requires a human-centred recovery from the pandemic, which will be made possible by improving women’s employment outcomes and reducing the gender pay gap.
While the full impact of the pandemic is yet to be known, it is clear that its impact has been uneven, with women being among the worst affected in terms of their income security — partly due to their representation in sectors hard hit by COVID-19, combined with the gendered division of family responsibilities. Many women reverted to full-time care of children and the elderly during the pandemic, foregoing their livelihoods to do so.
This is attested by the International Labour Organization’s “Global Wage Report 2020–21” which suggests the crisis inflicted massive downward pressure on wages and disproportionately affected women’s total wages compared to men. This greater wage reduction for women means that the pre-existing gender pay gap has widened.
Despite notable progress in closing the gender pay gap over time in India, the gap remains high by international standards. Indian women earned, on an average, 48% less compared to their male counterparts in 1993-94.
Since then, the gap declined to 28% in 2018-19 as in the labour force survey data of the National Sample Survey Office (NSSO).
The pandemic reversed decades of progress as preliminary estimates from the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) 2020-21 show an increase in the gap by 7% between 2018-19 and 2020-21.
The data further suggests that faster decline in female wages during the pandemic contributed to this decline, compared to a faster growth in male wages, which requires urgent policy attention.
While individual characteristics such as education, skills or experience explain part of the gender pay gap, a large part of the gender pay gap can still be attributed purely to discrimination based on one’s gender or sex.
Gender-based discriminatory practices include: lower wages paid to women for work of equal value; undervaluation of women’s work in highly feminised occupations and enterprises, and motherhood pay gap — lower wages for mothers compared to non-mothers.
OPED
A disruptive nexus of China and Pakistan (Page no. 9)
(GS Paper 2, International Relations)
Recently, China used its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to put a hold on the UN Security Council’s Al Qaida and ISIL (Daesh) Sanctions Committee’s (also known as the UNSC 1267 Committee) listing of Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist Sajid Mir, one of India’s most wanted in the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
Earlier, China had blocked the listing of US-designated terrorists Abdul RehmanMakki and Abdul Rauf Azhar of the LeT and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), respectively. It may be recalled that China brazenly opposed the listing of JeM chief Masood Azhar for ten years until 2019 before lifting the hold.
These terrorists are based in Pakistan and enjoy the patronage of its “deep state”. Despite China’s efforts to save its “all weather friend” from global censure, Pakistan continues to be in the “grey list” of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
China’s misuse of its P-5 status disrupts collective efforts to counter terrorism. Such actions are in direct contrast to the consensus at the global level on the scourge that is international terrorism.
Counter-terrorism is not the only area in which the Sino-Pak tandem has weakened global efforts. The two have a long history of collusion in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems as well.
There are other examples of collaboration in military matters and in the area of infrastructure and connectivity that have proved destabilising to regional stability in South Asia.
The Sino-Pak nexus in the field of nuclear and missile proliferation is well recorded. The illicit A.Q. Khan network evolved into a three-way proliferation with China and Pakistan helping one another with bomb designs.
Together, the two countries also helped North Korea with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had reported that between 1991 and 1993, China supplied 34 M-11 short range missiles to Pakistan in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
Subsequent cooperation included Chinese supply to Pakistan of ring magnets for high-speed centrifuges and the grandfathering of existing arrangements to deepen cooperation through the Chashma series of nuclear reactors.
Strong military ties have been the bedrock of China-Pakistan relations since the 1960s. For China, this has emerged as a low-cost tool to balance India and keep it hemmed in the sub-continent.
Around 47% of China’s military exports go to Pakistan and involve the full spectrum of support from small arms to fighter jets, as well as ships and submarines.
These include advanced equipment such as the JF-17 fighter jets, the K-8 training aircraft, Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), the Al-Khalid tanks and the Babur cruise missile, among others.
The so-called China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) is one of the mainstays of connectivity under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
It violates the Sino-Pak border agreement of March 1963, Article 6 of which explicitly refers to its interim nature. Undertaken without any wider consultation with India, which has territorial claims over the region through which it runs, the CPEC has proved disruptive to both India-Pakistan and India-China relations.
What numbers don’t tell us (Page no. 9)
(GS Paper 2, Health/Social Justice)
The latest numbers are out. 9,180 prisoners with mental illness, 150 deaths by suicide, five prisoners with schizophrenia and epilepsy have died.
While we know the numbers, we do not know what is being considered as a mental illness and whether these numbers are limited to persons who are in the mental health ward, or does it also include those who are living in barracks but still on psychiatric medication.
We also do not know when the onset of the illness was and what the different illnesses were or how long they have been in prison for. The National Crime Records Bureau’s (NCRB) Prison Statistics India Report is out for the year 2021. Perhaps it needs repeating, yet again that there is a mental health crisis in prisons.
We often hear that the aim of punishment (or at least one of its aims) is reform and rehabilitation. Yet when we look at the place where that punishment is served, we find conditions that, instead of promoting rehabilitation, ensure despair, hopelessness and helplessness.
In any case, our prisons are not overcrowded with convicts, rather it is the undertrial population that makes up for over 70% of prison population. More than half of those with mental illness were undertrials (58.4% were undertrials, while 41.3% were convicts). However, the numbers could very well be higher.
For instance, Project 39A’s report on mental health and the death penalty, Deathworthy, revealed that over 60% of death row prisoners had a current episode of mental illness, but many of them had not been identified by the prison as needing treatment and care. Deathworthy also revealed that suicide had little to do with mental illness and a lot with absent social support, violence, distress, and despair.
India’s National Mental Health Policy, 2014, considers prisoners a class of people vulnerable to mental ill-health. But while the NRCB gives us data confirming this categorisation, it does not take us much further towards crafting solutions, and leaves us none the wiser.
Why do we have so many prisoners living with mental illness? Were all these prisoners living with a mental illness before incarceration, or did they have their first episode in prison? The system is not equipped to give us such crucial information.
Understanding these numbers in a meaningful context is important because without that our default response to this crisis will continue to be that of treatment and conversations will get stuck at the poor healthcare infrastructure in prison.
To resolve the mental health crisis in prison, a purely medical approach will take us only so far. We need to take a more all-encompassing approach, move beyond treatment of individuals and towards identifying the social and underlying determinants of mental health in prisons.
We need to look at mental health in prisons from a social and structural perspective as well. Otherwise, we might end up with a heavily medicated prison population, but not a healthy one.
Explainer
The ban on the export of broken rice (Page no. 10)
(GS Paper 3, Economy/Environment)
The story so far: On September 9, the Centre instituted a ban on the export of broken rice. Additionally, it mandated an export duty of 20% on rice in husk (paddy or rough), husked (brown rice) and semi-milled or wholly-milled rice.
The measures do not affect export of basmati or parboiled rice. The Secretary at the Department of Food and Public Distribution Sudhanshu Pandey stated that the measures would ensure adequate availability of broken rice for consumption by the domestic poultry industry and for other animal feedstock.
Additionally, it would sustain production of ethanol that would further assist the successful implementation of the Union government’s Ethanol Blending Programme (EBP).
However, the measures may affect countries dependent on Indian food exports in the face of a lost ‘breadbasket’ in Ukraine owing to the Russian conflict.
The lower the supply of a commodity, the higher would be the price of a product, which results in inflationary pressures. The adequacy of rice stocks in the country would ensure that markets do not experience excess demand and thus, trigger an abrupt price rise.
For seven consecutive months, inflation has been above the Reserve Bank of India’s 6% tolerability threshold. The Consumer Price Index (CPI), or retail-based inflation, stood at 7% in August this year with rural and urban inflation scaling 7.15% and 6.72% respectively. This was furthered by an uptick of 7.62% in food prices during the same period.
The COVID-19 pandemic also had an impact on India’s previously held surplus. As a reaction to the distresses caused by the pandemic to the vulnerable sections the Union Cabinet had introduced a food security program, called the Pradhan MantriGaribKalyan Anna Yojana (PM-GKAY) in March 2020.
The scheme provisions an additional 5kg ration per person each month in addition to their normal quota of foodgrains under the National Food Security Act. In March, the scheme was extended for another six months until September 2022.
The Hindu Businessline had reported this week that foodgrain stocks (including rice, wheat and unmilled paddy) in the Food Corporation of India (FCI)’s central pool had dropped 33.5% on a year-over-year basis to 60.11 million tonnes as of September 1 — prompting doubts on the continuation of the scheme.
The process of inclusion/exclusion from the Scheduled Tribes list (Page no. 10)
(GS Paper 2, Polity and Governance)
On September 14, the Union Cabinet approved a proposal to add several tribes to the list of Scheduled Tribes (ST) in States such as Himachal Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Chhattisgarh and Uttar Pradesh, so that they can avail of benefits meant for STs, including reservation.
The announcement by Minister of Tribal Affairs Arjun Munda came even as six tribal communities of Assam — Adivasi, Chutia, Koch-Rajbongshi, Matak, Moran and Tai-Ahom — threatened to launch protests over an "inordinate delay" in their inclusion in the ST list.
The communities approved for inclusion in the ST list are the Hatti tribe in the Trans-Giri area of Sirmour district in Himachal Pradesh, the hill tribes of Narikoravan and Kurivikkaran of Tamil Nadu, the Binjhia community in Chhattisgarh and the Gond community in certain districts of Uttar Pradesh.
The Cabinet has approved the addition of several alternative names for already existing Scheduled Tribes in Chhattisgarh and Karnataka so that the difference in spellings and pronunciations do not result in members of these communities being left out of the benefits meant for them.
Significantly, even as the Union Cabinet has decided to include these communities under the ST list, this is not the first time they have been categorised for benefits of reservation. Most of these communities had been either included in the list of Scheduled Castes (SC) or Most Backward Classes till now.
The process begins at the level of a State or Union Territory, with the concerned government or administration seeking the addition or exclusion of a particular community from the SC or ST list.
The final decision rests with the President’s office issuing a notification specifying the changes under powers vested in it from Articles 341 and 342.
The inclusion or exclusion of any community in the Scheduled Tribes or Scheduled Castes list come into effect only after the President assents to a Bill that amends the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950, as is appropriate, after it is passed by both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha.
A State government may choose to recommend certain communities for addition or subtraction from the list of SCs/STs based on its discretion.
This recommendation may come from studies it commissions like in the case of classifying the Hatti community in Himachal Pradesh. Following this, the proposal to include or remove any community from the Scheduled List is sent to the Union Ministry of Tribal Affairs from the concerned State government.
After this, the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, through its own deliberations, examines the proposal, and sends it to the Registrar General of India (RGI).
Once approved by the RGI, the proposal is sent to the National Commission for Scheduled Castes or National Commission for Scheduled Tribes, following which the proposal is sent back to the Union government, which after inter-ministerial deliberations, introduces it in the Cabinet for final approval.
As for the communities approved for addition to the list by the Cabinet earlier last week, a Bill was introduced in
News
Insurgency down in northeast, Army shifts to LAC (Page no. 12)
(GS Paper 3, Internal Security)
With insurgency having significantly gone down in the northeast as seen by recent revocation of Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in several parts of the region, the Army has been able to pull out most of its troops from Counter Insurgency (CI) duties to refocus on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) amid the stand-off with China in Eastern Ladakh in the last two years. Assam Rifles is now responsible for all CI duties.
There is only one Army Brigade in the entire Eastern sector now tasked with CI duties with its mandate spread across four districts of Assam bordering Arunachal.
Insurgency has waned and the counter to it has also changed. It is a whole-of-the-nation approach now. Now the battle is for the mind-space,” said Brig. K.S. Gill, commanding the 73 Brigade. Recruitment still happens but has come down in last two years.
Elaborating, he said while space for United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) is shrinking, residual potential still remains and “it’s a threat in being” as threat of use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), kidnapping and extortion loom large.
However, their operational space is reducing due to constant pressure on them and outreach to people for development, Brig. Gill said adding they continue to keep pressure by area domination, keeping up checks and “intelligence-based ethical operations.”
Terming the lifting of AFSPA from areas of Manipur, Nagaland and Assam as a “momentous achievement” made possible by reduction in violence, Eastern Army Commander Lt. Gen. R.P. Kalita noted that the Act is now restricted to only those areas where remnants of militancy still exist.
With public support and our constant domination of these areas, I am sanguine that in the future, more such areas will reach a level of peace,” he said speaking on the sidelines of an event at Kibithu. The situation is dynamic and is being constantly monitored.
The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has also been active and keeping up the pressure. In addition to dwindling recruitment, there have also been desertions among the cadres and also differences among the various factions.
In this regard, the footprint of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) has been seen in Assam of late, officials on the ground said, with inputs suggesting that that NSCN (Ky) is working with ULFA. NSCN (Ky) is active in Longding, Tirap and Changlng districts of Nagaland and so offers a conduit for ULFA.
Among the various initiatives by the Army to win hearts and minds of the people, those that have caught attention are an effort to impart training in football and another to impart training to students to crack national-level entrance examinations for engineering and medicine.